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Abstract—We describe and evaluate a bug refutation extension
for the Clang Static Analyzer (CSA) that addresses the limi-
tations of the existing built-in constraint solver. In particular,
we complement CSA’s existing heuristics that remove spurious
bug reports. We encode the path constraints produced by CSA
as Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) problems, use SMT
solvers to precisely check them for satisfiability, and remove
bug reports whose associated path constraints are unsatisfi-
able. Our refutation extension refutes spurious bug reports in
8 out of 12 widely used open-source applications; on aver-
age, it refutes ca. 7% of all bug reports, and never refutes
any true bug report. It incurs only negligible performance
overheads, and on average adds 1.2% to the runtime of the
full Clang/LLVM toolchain. A demonstration is available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ylW5iRYNsGA.
I. INTRODUCTION
LLVM comprises a set of reusable components for program
compilation [1]; unlike other popular compilers, e.g., GCC
and its monolithic architecture [2]. Clang [3] is an LLVM
component that implements a frontend for C, C++, ObjectiveC
and their various extensions. Clang and LLVM are used as the
main compiler technology in several closed- and open-source
ecosystems, including MacOS and OpenBSD [4].
The Clang Static Analyzer (CSA) [5] is an open-source
project built on top of Clang that can perform context-sensitive
interprocedural analysis for programs written in the languages
supported by Clang. CSA symbolically executes the program,
collects constraints, and reasons about bug reachability using
a built-in constraint solver. It was designed to be fast, so that
it can provide results for common mistakes (e.g., division by
zero or NULL pointer dereference) even in complex programs.
However, its speed comes at the expense of precision, and it
cannot handle some arithmetic (e.g., remainder) and bitwise
operations. In such cases, CSA can explore execution paths
along which constraints do not hold, which can lead to
incorrect results being reported.
1 unsigned i n t f unc ( unsigned i n t a ) {
2 unsigned i n t ∗z = 0 ;
3 i f ( ( a & 1) && ( ( a & 1) ˆ 1 ) )
4 re turn ∗z ;
5 re turn 0 ;
6 }
Fig. 1: A small C safe program. The dereference in line 4 is
unreachable because the guard in line 3 is always false.
Consider the program in Fig. 1. This program is safe, i.e.,
the unsafe pointer dereference in line 4 is unreachable because
the guard in line 3 is not satisfiable; a & 1 holds if the last
bit in a is one, and (a & 1) ˆ 1 inverts the last bit in a.
The analyzer, however, produces the following (spurious) bug
report when analyzing the program:
main.c:4:12: warning: Dereference of null
pointer (loaded from variable ’z’)
return *z;
ˆ˜
1 warning generated.
The null pointer dereference reported here means that CSA
claims to nevertheless have found a path where the dereference
of z is reachable.
Such spurious bug reports are in practice common; in our
experience, about 50% of the reports in large systems are
actually spurious. Junker et al. [6] report similar numbers for
a similar static analysis technology. Identifying spurious bug
reports and refactoring the code to suppress them puts a large
burden on developers and runs the risk of introducing actual
bugs; these issues negate the purpose of a lightweight, fast
static analysis technology.
Here we present a solution to this conundrum. We first use
the fast but imprecise built-in solver to analyze the program
and find potential bugs, then use slower but precise SMT
solvers to refute (or validate) them; a bug is only reported
if the SMT solver confirms that the bug is reachable. We
implemented this approach inside Clang and evaluated it over
twelve widely used C/C++ open-source projects of various size
using five different SMT solvers. Our experiments show that
our refutation extension can remove false bug reports from
8 out of the 12 analyzed projects; on average, it refuted 11
(or approximately 7% of all) bug reports per project, with a
maximum of 51 reports refuted for XNU; it never refuted any
true bug report. Its performance overheads are negligible and
on average our extension adds only 1.2% to the runtime of the
full Clang/LLVM toolchain.
II. THE CLANG STATIC ANALYZER
CSA performs a context-sensitive interprocedural data-flow
analysis via graph reachability [7] and relies on a set of
checkers, which implement the logic for detecting specific
types of bugs [5], [8]. Each path in a function is explored,
which includes taking separate branches and different loop
unrollings. Function calls on these paths are inlined whenever
possible, so their contexts and paths are visible from the
caller’s context.
Real-world programs, however, usually depend on external
factors, such as user inputs or results from library components,
for which source code is not always available [9]. These
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Fig. 2: Exploded graph of the program in Fig. 1, which
contains bitwise operations that are not properly handled by
CSA’s original constraint solver, thus generating a spurious
bug report.
unknown values are represented by algebraic symbols, and the
built-in constraint solver in the static analyzer reasons about
reachability based on expressions containing these symbols.
CSA relies on a set of checkers that are engineered to find
specific types of bugs, ranging from undefined behaviour to
security property violations, e.g., incorrect usage of insecure
functions like strcpy and strcat [10]. The checkers
subscribe to events (i.e., specific operations that occur during
symbolic execution) that are relevant to their bug targets;
for example, the nullability checker subscribes to pointer
dereferences. They then check the constraints in the current
path and throw warnings if they consider a bug to be reachable.
These checkers can report incorrect results since the sym-
bolic analysis is incomplete (i.e., they can miss some true
bugs) and unsound (i.e., they can generate spurious bug
reports). The sources of these incorrect results are approxi-
mations in two components, namely the control-flow analysis
and the constraint solver.
The control-flow analysis evaluates function calls inside the
same translation unit (TU); if the symbolic execution engine
finds a function call implemented in another TU, then the call
is skipped and pointers and references passed as parameters
are invalidated while the function return value is assumed to
be unknown. Cross translation unit support (CTU) is under
development [8]; it is not part of the CSA main branch yet.
The built-in constraint solver (based on interval arithmetic)
was built to be fast rather than precise, and removes ex-
pressions from the reasoning if they contain unsupported
operations (e.g, remainders and bitwise operations) or are too
complex (e.g., contain more than one operator symbol).
The bug reports generated by the checkers are then post-
processed before they are reported to the user. In this final
step, a number of heuristics are applied to remove incorrect
bug reports and to beautify the reports. The reports are also
deduplicated, so that different paths that lead to the same bug
only generate one report.
As an example of this process, consider the exploded
graph [7] in Fig. 2; it represents the graph explored by the
analyzer when analyzing the program in Fig. 1. Here, a node
s is a pair (V,C), where V is a map var → 2128 that maps
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reports
SMT Refutation
Source
Code
Static 
Analyzer
SAT Bug 
Reports
Z3
Boolector MathSAT
Yices CVC4
constraints
SAT/
UNSAT
Checkers
Constraint solver
constraints
SAT/
UNSAT
clang
AST
bug 
report
Fig. 3: The refutation extension in the Clang Static Analyzer.
a value to every variable var in the program, and C is a map
var → 2128 × 2128 that maps the interval constraints to every
variable var required to reach that node. An edge is a tuple
(si, OP, si+1), modeling the constraints on a transition from
si to si+1, and OP is a operation performed in the transition,
either changing a constraint c ∈ C or a read/write operation
over a var ∈ V . We also reserve two special symbols: an 
node is a property violation and unknown values are shown
as “*” symbols.
CSA’s “NullDereference” checker static analyzer adds the
transition to  representing a dereference of z when it is null.
Note that error node is added when the parameter a is read
(even if it was not explicitly initialized), because parameters
are assumed to be unknown rather than of uninitialized values,
unless the control-flow analysis infers otherwise. The analyzer
will explore all paths in the graph because it cannot infer that
the constraint that leads to node s4 is always false.
III. REFUTING FALSE BUGS USING SMT SOLVERS
One approach to address the limitations of the built-in con-
straint solver is to replace it by an SMT solver. This approach
has been implemented in Clang but empirical evaluations show
that this approach can be up to 20 times slower.1
We developed an alternative solution: we use the more
precise SMT solvers to reason about bug reachability only
in the post processing step. CSA already has heuristics in
place to remove incorrect bug reports, so we extended those
heuristics to precisely encode the constraints in SMT and to
check for satisfiability. Fig. 3 illustrates the architecture of our
solution. After the static analyzer generates the bug reports, the
SMT-based refutation extension will encode the constraints as
SMT formulas and check them for satisfiability. CSA already
supports constraint encoding in SMT using Z3 [11] but we
also implemented support for Boolector [12], Yices [13],
MathSAT [14], and CVC4 [15].
A bug report BR is a straight line graph representing the
path to a property violation (i.e., an -node). Our refutation
extension walks backwards through all nodes si in BR,
collects their constraints, and checks their conjunction for
satisfiability. If the formula is unsatisfiable, the bug is spurious.
Our constraints encoding algorithm is shown in Algo-
rithm 1. Assume a set of constraints C, an SMT formula Φ,
1https://reviews.llvm.org/D28952
and a method encode(expr,Φ), which encodes an expression
expr in the SMT formula Φ. Algorithm 1 contains two
optimizations when encoding constraints: duplicated symbol
constraints are ignored (line 2) and if the constraint is a
concrete value (the lower bound is equal to the upper bound),
the constraint is encoded as an equality (line 3). Note that
ignoring symbol constraints in line 2 is only possible because
the refutation extension runs from the last node in a bug report
(the property violation) to the initial node; any new symbol
constraint found when walking backwards will always be a
subset of the symbol constraints already encoded.
Fig. 4 shows the SMT formula of the bug found when
analyzing the program in Fig. 1. The formula is equivalent
to the path [s0, s1, s2, s4, ] in Fig. 2 and $0 is the value of
the variable a. Since the formula is unsatisfiable, CSA will
not produce a bug report for this path.
1 ( d e c l a r e−fun $0 ( ) ( Bi tVec 3 2 ) )
2 ( a s s e r t (= ( ( e x t r a c t 0 0 ) $0 ) #b1 ) )
3 ( a s s e r t (= ( ( e x t r a c t 0 0 ) $0 ) #b0 ) )
Fig. 4: The SMT formula of the bug report from Fig. 1, using
Z3. Note that the solver was able to simplify the formula to
two assertions: the first bit should be one and zero at the same
time. Since this is a contradiction, the formula is UNSAT.
A. Running the Clang Static Analyzer
To run the clang static analyzer is enough to use the
scan-build tool shipped with clang. The tool runs the
clang static analyzer during the compilation of the project
and it is simple to use: instead of running make, simply
run scan-build make. Scan-build offers several options
to customize the analysis, including enabling (and disabling)
the various checker in the clang static analyzer and enabling
our refutation extension. Once the build is done, a detailed
report is generated for each reported bug.
To analyze a project with our refutation extension
enabled, run scan-build -analyzer-config
‘crosscheck-with-smt=true’ make. Detailed
instructions on how to run the clang static
analyzer with the different solvers are available in
https://github.com/mikhailramalho/clang.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
The experimental evaluation of our refutation extension
consists of two parts. We first present the research questions,
projects evaluated and the environment setup, before we com-
pare the analysis results of the CSA with and without the bug
refutation extension enabled; the two approaches are compared
in terms of number of refuted bugs and verification time.
A. Experimental Objectives and Setup
Our experimental evaluation aims to answer two research
questions:
RQ1 (soundness) Is our approach sound and can the refuted
bugs be confirmed?
RQ2 (performance) Is our approach able to refute spurious
bug reports in a reasonable amount of time?
Algorithm 1: encodeConstraint(cs,Φ)
Input: A set of constraints C and an SMT formula Φ
Output: The formula Φ with all constraints c encoded in
SMT
1 foreach c ∈ C do
2 if c.var ∈ Φ then continue;
3 if c.interval.lower == c.interval.upper then
4 encode(c.var == c.interval.lower,Φ)
5 end
6 else
7 encode(c.var ≥ c.interval.lower ∧
c.var ≤ c.interval.upper,Φ)
8 end
9 end
We evaluated the new bug refutation extension in twelve
open-source C/C++ projects: tmux (v2.7), a terminal mul-
tiplexer; redis (v4.0.9), an in-memory database; openSSL
(v1.1.1-pre6), a software library for secure communication;
twin (v0.8.0), a windowing environment; git (v2.17.0), a ver-
sion control system; postgreSQL (v10.4), an object-relational
database management system; SQLite3 (v3230100), a rela-
tional database management system; curl (v7.61.0), command-
line tool for transferring data; libWebM (v1.0.0.27), a WebM
container library; memcached (v1.5.9), a general-purpose dis-
tributed memory caching system; xerces-c++ (v3.2.1), a val-
idating XML parser; and XNU (v4570.41.2), the operating
system kernel used in Apple products.
All experiments were conducted on a desktop computer with
an Intel Core i7-2600 running at 3.40GHz and 24GB of RAM.
We used Clang v7.0. A time limit of 15s per bug report was
set for the projects. All scripts required to analyze all the
projects are available in https://github.com/mikhailramalho/
analyzer-projects.
B. Bug Refutation Comparison
Projects time (s) time (s) reported bugs refuted
(no ref) (with ref) (no ref) bugs
tmux 86.5 89.9 19 0
redis 347.8 338.3 93 1
openSSL 138.0 128.0 38 2
twin 225.6 216.7 63 1
git 488.7 405.9 70 11
postgreSQL 1167.2 1112.4 196 6
SQLite3 1078.6 1058.4 83 15
curl 79.8 79.9 39 0
libWebM 43.9 44.2 6 0
memcached 96.0 96.2 25 0
xerces-c++ 489.8 433.2 81 2
XNU 3441.7 3405.1 557 51
Total 7683.7 7408.5 1270 89
TABLE I: Results of the analysis with and without refutation.
Table I shows the results of CSA with and without bug
refutation enabled. Here, time (s) (no ref) is the analysis time
without refutation, time (s) (ref) is the analysis times with
refutation enabled, averaged over all supported solvers (Z3,
Boolector, MathSAT, Yices and CVC4), reported bugs (no ref)
is the number of bug reports produced without refutation and
refuted bugs is the number of refuted bugs. All solvers refuted
the same bugs. There were bugs refuted in 8 out of the 12
analyzed projects: redis, openssl, twin, git, postgresql, sqlite3,
xerces and XNU. On average, 11 bugs were refuted when
analyzing these projects, with up to 51 bugs refuted in XNU.
In total, 89 bugs were refuted and an in-depth analysis of
them show that all of them were false positives, and thus affirm
RQ1. Our technique, however, is not able to refute all false
bugs as the unsound interprocedural analysis is another source
of false positives in CSA and it was not addressed in this work.
The average time to analyze the projects with refuted bugs
was 35.0 seconds faster, a 6.25% speed up, and thus affirm
RQ2. This because the static analyzer generates html reports
for each bug, which involves intensive use of IO (e.g., the html
report produced for the program in Fig. 1 is around 25kB), and
by removing these false bugs, fewer reports are generated and
the analysis is slightly faster. Out of the four projects, where no
bug was refuted (tmux, curl, libWebM and memcached), the
analysis was 1.0 second slower on average: a 1.24% slowdown.
V. RELATED WORK
Static analysis of programs has seen a great improvement
in the last years and in many cases it has been applied for
the analysis of big real world projects. Frama-C [16] is an
extensible analysis framework based on abstract interpretation
for the C language. It also has a large number of plugins for
checking different program properties. Infer [17] is an open-
source static code analysis tool used for the verification of the
Facebook code base and on many mobile apps (e.g., What-
sApp) and is adopted by many companies (e.g., Mozilla, Spo-
tify). Cppcheck [18] focuses on detecting dangerous coding
practices and undefined behaviours. It was used for detecting
many vulnerabilities including a stack overflow in X.org.
The use of SMT solvers as backends for static analysis
tools is a well known approach. It has been adopted in the
ESBMC [19] C/C++ bounded model checker. It encodes the
program as a SMT formula and depending on its satisfiability
it detects possible bugs. This encoding technique is proved to
be sound, however, it does not scale up to real world programs.
An approach similar to the one adopted in this paper has
also been used in Goanna [6]: a C/C++ static analyzer able to
scale up to real world programs (e.g., OpenSSL, WireShark).
After detecting all bugs, false ones are eliminated by analyzing
the feasibility of error paths using SMT solvers. The biggest
difference between Goanna and our approach is on the first
(imprecise) analysis: Goanna uses NuXmv and MathSAT5
to generate the bug reports, while we use a custom built
constraint solver. Similarly to our approach, they use Z3 to
encode and refute false bug reports, but we offer a wider
selection of SMT solvers to choose from.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Our SMT-based bug refutation extension in the clang static
analyzer is a simple but powerful extension; it is able to
prevent reporting the class of false bugs generated by the
unsound constraint solver while introducing minimal overhead
to the analysis. In particular, the empirical evaluation show
that the bug refutation extension can consistently reduce the
analysis time if bugs are removed, while the slow down when
no bug is refuted is negligible. We used five different solvers in
our experiments (Z3, Boolector, MathSAT, Yices and CVC4)
and their performance is equivalent. Our refutation extension
using Z3 is already part of the clang version 7 and the support
for the other solvers (Boolector, MathSAT, Yices and CVC4)
is under review for clang version 8.
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